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We use the time series of shifts in U.S. Federal tax liabilities constructed by Romer and Romer to
estimate tax multipliers. Differently from the single-equation approach adopted by Romer and Romer,
our estimation strategy (a Var that includes output, government spending and revenues, inflation and
the nominal interest rate) does not rely upon the assumption that tax shocks are orthogonal to each
other as well as to lagged values of other macro variables. Our estimated multiplier is much smaller:
one, rather than three at a three-year horizon. When we split the sample in two sub-samples (before
and after 1980) we find, before 1980, a multiplier whose size is never greater than one, after 1980
a multiplier not significantly different from zero. Following the findings in Bohn (1998), we also experiment
with a model that includes debt and the non-linear government budget constraint. We find that, while
in general not very important, the non-linearity that arises from the budget constraint makes a difference
after 1980, when the response of fiscal variables to the level of the debt becomes stronger.
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In some recent papers the estimated eﬀects on output (using post World War II data)
of a shift in U.S. federal tax liabilities imply a multiplier signiﬁcantly greater than
one. Romer and Romer (forthcoming, R&R in what follows) ﬁnd that tax increases
are highly contractionary: according to their estimates a tax increase equivalent to 1
per cent of U.S. GDP reduces output over the next three years by nearly 3 per cent.
The eﬀect is highly statistically signiﬁcant.
R&R use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional
reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar
tax policy actions. This analysis allows them to separate legislated changes into those
taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more
exogenous reasons–for instance for philosophical reasons or to reduce an inherited
budget deﬁcit. Their estimates of the eﬀects on output of shifts in taxes use only
these more exogenous changes. Thus they avoid the omitted variable bias that aﬀects
regressions of output on aggregate measures of tax changes, many of which are not
legislated at all, but occur automatically because the tax base varies with the overall
level of income, or because of changes in stock prices, inﬂation, and other non-policy
forces. An additional advantage of the R&R ”narrative approach” to the identiﬁcation
of ”tax shocks” is that it allows to separate tax changes that are anticipated from
those that caught the economy by surprise. Mertens and Ravn (2008) use the R&R
measure of shifts in taxes and distinguish between those that were anticipated from
those that were not. Their ﬁndings conﬁrm the large multiplier reported by R&R and
show that anticipated and unanticipated shifts in taxes have similar eﬀects–though
anticipated tax cuts, before they are implemented, tend to have a contractionary
eﬀect on output.
The size of these multipliers surprises even the authors and are much larger than
those obtained in other studies. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use U.S. data starting
in 1960, and thus exclude the ﬁr s t1 5y e a r so ft h eR & Rs a m p l e : t h e ye s t i m a t ea
multiplier for tax changes which is statistically signiﬁcant, but whose size (1.3) is
less than a half. 1 R&R suggest that these diﬀerences are the result of the failure
of structural VAR’s–the technique used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti
1Interestingly, Perotti (2008) shows that the result for the entire sample (1960 to 2001) averages
very diﬀerent values of the multiplier before and after 1980. In the ﬁrst part of the sample tax cuts
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on output, with a multiplier only slightly smaller compared
with R&R (around 2.6 at a three year horizon). After 1980, however, the eﬀect turns around: the
multiplier becomes negative and signiifcant and its absolute value remains similar.
2(2008) and in similar studies–to identify truly exogenous shifts in taxes.2
In this paper we assess the robustness of the evidence of a large tax multiplier
using the measure of exogenous shifts in taxes constructed by R&R but a diﬀerent
econometric speciﬁcation.
First, we show that the equation R&R estimate to compute the eﬀects of a shift
in taxes can be interpreted as the moving average representation of the equation for
output growth in a VAR model which includes a larger set of variables: along with
output growth, government revenues, government spending, inﬂation and nominal in-
terest rates. This representation however is truncated and yields consistent estimates
of the tax multiplier under the assumption that tax shocks are not only orthogonal
to each other, but that they are also orthogonal to any other macro shock (produc-
tivity shocks, shifts in government spending, or in monetary policy, etc.) and to the
excluded lags of the macro variables that belong in the VAR. When we relax this
assumption we ﬁnd multipliers whose size is much smaller than that estimated by
R&R. When we split the sample in two sub-samples (before and after 1980) we ﬁnd,
before 1980, multipliers whose size is never greater than one per cent of GDP; after
1980 multipliers not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We have included in our VAR this particular list of variables (output growth, gov-
ernment revenues, government spending, inﬂation and nominal interest rates) because
these are the variables that belong in the government intertemporal budget constraint.
In Section 3 we explain why the eﬀects of tax shocks should be estimated recognizing
that the government is subject to such a constraint and what diﬀerence it makes in
practice. We start from the ﬁndings by Henning Bohn (1998) which suggests that
U.S. ﬁscal policy reacts to the level of the debt ratio. If ﬁscal variables respond to the
level of the debt, then the analysis of the impact of tax shocks should be conducted by
2The identiﬁcation strategy followed in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) uses institutional informa-
tion about the tax and transfer systems and the timing of tax collections to identify the automatic
responses of taxes and spending to activity, and, by implication, to infer exogenous ﬁscal shocks.
Recently, the validity of this identiﬁcation approach has been questioned on the argument that it
cannot take properly account of ﬁscal foresight. Leeper et al. (2008) point out that legislative and
implementation lags provide private agents with clear signals about the tax rates they will face in the
future. Paired with the forward looking behavious of agents, this produces equilibrium time series
with a non-invertible moving average component (see Hansen and Sargent, 1991, Lippi and Reichlin,
1994). As a consequence of the misalignament between the agents’ and the econometrician’s informa-
tion sets, economically meaningful shocks to taxes cannot be extracted from statistical innovations
in the VAR. The narrative approach to the identiﬁcation of tax shocks employed in R&R is immune
from the ﬁscal foresight problem that aﬀects strctural VARs.
3explicitly recognizing a role for debt and for the stock-ﬂow identity linking debt and
deﬁcits. 3 We do this estimating the multiplier associated with the R&R tax shocks
keeping track of the eﬀect that such shocks have on the path of the debt ratio, and
allowing for a response of taxes, spending, output, inﬂation and interest rates to the
level of the debt. This introduces into the model a source of non-linearity (among the
ﬁve macro variables included) which arises from the government intertemporal budget
constraint. We ﬁnd no major diﬀerence in the eﬀects of tax shocks estimated omit-
ting debt and the debt dynamics equation (and thus using a linear model), and those
estimated including debt and the non-linear equation which describes debt dynamics.
We surmise that the reason why overlooking this non-linearity does not appear to
be important–or at least as important as overlooking the simultaneity highlighted
in the previous paragraph–could be that the ﬁve variables entering the government
budget constraint already enter (albeit linearly) the equations of a ﬁscal VAR that
excludes debt. Non-linearity, however, appears to make a diﬀerence whenever–as in
happens in the United States after 1980–the response of ﬁscal variables to the level
of the debt becomes stronger.
2E s t i m a t i n g t h e e ﬀects of tax changes
Having constructed a time series of exogenous shifts in taxes, uτ
t−i–where each uτ
t−i
measures the impact of a tax change at the time it was implemented (t − i)o n
tax liabilities at time t–R&R measure their eﬀect on output, Yt, estimating, using
quarterly data and ordinary least squares, a single equation of the form




t−i + et (1)
Careful analysis of the motivation behind each uτ
t allows R&R to assume that this
variable is uncorrelated with the error term et, i.e. that the shifts in taxes described
by uτ0
t s are unrelated to other factors likely aﬀect output growth (and to any other
tax responses policymakers may have been making to those factors at around the
same time). The eﬀects of a tax shift on output growth can then be described by the
impulse response constructed using the estimates of the bi coeﬃcients and allowing
fora lag of three years (M = 12).
In Figure 1 we have replicated the original results by R&R. The ﬁgure reports
3Corsetti et al. (2009) show that the impact of a shift in public spending depends on expectations
about oﬀsetting ﬁscal measures in the future.
4the eﬀect on output between period t and period t+i of a shift in taxes occurring in
period t and equivalent to one per cent of U.S. GDP in period t. We use quarterly data
(described in the Data Appendix) and we report three impulse response functions:
one based on estimates from a sample running from 1950:1 to 2006:2, and two based
on estimates restricted to two sub-samples: 1950:1-1980:4 and 1981:1-2006:2. Our
sample starts in 1950, rather than in 1947, the starting date of the R&R sample. The
reason (as explained in the Data Appendix) is that we want to compare the results
in R&R with those obtained using the uτ0
t s in a VAR which also contains an equation
for government spending–and consistent data on government spending are available
only from 1950:1. We end in 2006:2, the last date for which the R&R shocks are
available. The slightly shorter sample does not change the R&R result: the eﬀect on
output peaks, as in R&R, after ten quarters and implies a fall in output of about 3
per cent. The shape of the impulse response function also matches the original one.
The motivation for splitting the sample is the ﬁnding by Perotti (2008) of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks before and after 1980, in the U.S. as well as
in other countries. The results show a remarkable degree of stability of the eﬀect of
the R&R shocks based on the impulse responses from equation (1).
To analyze the robustness of these results we interpret equation (1) as a truncated
version of the MA representation of output in a closed-economy ﬁscal VAR which
includes output growth, inﬂation (π), the nominal rate of interest (i), government
revenues (τ) and government spending (g). As we shall explain in the next Section,
the reason we select these ﬁve variables is because they appear in the intertemporal
government budget constraint. Deﬁning these variables with the vector Z, the Vector
autoregression is












are structural shocks and their variance-covariance matrix
is I.
The MA representation of (2) is
Zt = Γ(L)εt (3)
where Γ(L) ≡ A−1B
1−A−1CL. The MA representation is not directly estimated in the
VAR approach, but can be derived by inversion after having estimated (2). To do
this one needs to identify the structural shocks εt: these can be obtained from the
reduced form innovations, et using the relation Aet = Bεt, after having imposed a
suﬃcient number of identifying restrictions on the matrices A and B. R&R don’t
need to do this because their narrative approach provides a direct measure of the
5tax shocks ετ
t which are the only structural shocks they use. They then derive the
impulse response by directly estimating the projection of output growth on the tax
shocks. In practice they estimate one equation of the truncated MA representation







where Γ0 ≡ A−1B, Γ1 ≡ A−1C. A comparison between (4) and (1) reveals that the
OLS estimates of the coeﬃcients bi obtained from (1) are consistent provided three
conditions are satisﬁed:
• the tax shocks uτ
t−i are independently distributed, otherwise the sum could not
be truncated at M,
• the tax shocks uτ
t−i are orthogonal to any other shock in εt that might inﬂuence
output growth,
• the tax shocks uτ
t−i are orthogonal to the variables in Zt−M+1.
The hypothesis that the uτ
t are not serially correlated can be tested empirically and
is satisﬁed in the time series constructed by R&R. Orthogonality of the tax shocks
to any other shock is the R&R’s identifying assumption: from an analysis of the
extensive discussion in the narrative record of why each ut
t−i action was taken, R&R
conclude that ”most actions had a single predominant motivation, and that some of
those motivations are unrelated to other factors likely to have important eﬀects on
output growth (and to any other tax responses policymakers may have been making to
those factors at around the same time)”.
There is an immediate way of validating the assumption that the uτ
t−i are orthog-
onal to any information in the VAR dated t − M + 1: include uτ
t in (2) and check
if the impulse response of output growth to the uτ
t shock obtained from the VAR is
the same as that delivered by the single equation approach adopted by R&R. (Note
that since we are only interested in the impulse response to a tax shock, to perform
this experiment we don’t need to identify any other structural shock). In fact impulse
responses to the R&R tax shocks can be easily obtained by introducing them as an
additional variable in (2).4
4Bagliano and Favero (1999) do this in the context of a monetary VAR to derive impulse responses
to measures of monetary policy shocks costructed outside the VAR framework.
6We have thus constructed impulse responses of output growth to the R&R tax





t + et (5)
where Zt includes the ﬁve variable mentioned above: the nominal rate of interest
(the average cost of the Federal debt), output growth (the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log
of real GDP), inﬂation (the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the price level), (the logs of)
government receipts and government expenditure net of interest. (The data we use
are described in the Data Appendix.). et are reduced form innovations.
Figure 2 compares the eﬀect on output of an uτ
t tax shock equivalent to one per
cent of U.S. GDP estimated using, alternatively, (1) (displayed as a dotted line) and
(5) (displayed as a continuos line). Estimating the eﬀect of tax shocks using the VAR
one obtains a response of output that is much smaller than that delivered by the sin-
gle equation approach adopted in R&R. The impact of a tax shock on output growth
estimated in a VAR never exceeds one per cent. The VAR also highlights the insta-
bility of the eﬀects of tax shocks between the periods preceding and following 1980:
t h ei m p a c to ft a xs h o c k si nt h eﬁrst sub-sample is larger and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the impact in the second sub-sample, where it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
The results in Figure 2 show that the diﬀerences between the two impulse responses–
that estimated using (1) and (5)–only appear after a few quarters, and not impact.
This is a clear symptom that the single-equation framework fails to capture some
signiﬁcant simultaneity. This simultaneity must arise from the correlation between
the tax shocks and the information included in the VAR in the periods preceding the
truncation of the MA representation directly estimated by R&R.
To see this point consider the simple case in which our VAR is of order one Then












Since by construction the uτ
t−i are orthogonal to the et−i, the diﬀerence in the
multipliers obtained estimating (1) and (6) must depend on the correlation between
uτ
t−i and Zt−M+1. This point can be easily seen re-running the R&R regression
augmenting it with Zt−M+1, i.e. running the following regression





i Zt−M+1 + et (7)
7This is a robustness check R&R do not perform since the robustness checks they
report only use information dated up to time M. Figure 3 reports the eﬀect of
tax shocks as computed originally by R&R alongwith those based on the augmented
regression (7) over the full sample 1950:1-2006:2. The ﬁgure shows that the truncation
has an eﬀect on the size of the multiplier approximately after the 8th quarter. The
multiplier estimated using the augmented regression then gets very close 5 to the one
delivered by the inclusion of the R&R shocks in a ﬁscal VAR i.e. by the estimation
of (5). Interestingly, the R2 increases from 0.09 in the original R&R speciﬁcation to
0.17 in the augmented speciﬁcation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify which
variable in Z is responsible for these results: the F −test for the joint signiﬁcance of
the regressors included in the augmented model rejects the null, but the t − tests on
the individual coeﬃcients do not point out any coeﬃcient, on a speciﬁcv a r i a b l e ,a ta
speciﬁc lag as strikingly signiﬁcant.
3D e b t a n d t h e e ﬀects of tax changes
Henning Bohn (1998), using a century of U.S data, documents a positive correlation
between the government surplus and the Federal debt–a result which suggests that
U.S. ﬁscal policy reacts to the level of the debt ratio. If ﬁscal variables respond to the
level of the debt, then the analysis of the impact of tax shocks should be conducted
by explicitly recognizing the eﬀect that such shock determine on the path of debt. For
instance, whether, or not, following a shift in taxes, the debt ratio will be stabilized,
will determine the response of the economy to the tax shock–which is likely to diﬀer
depending on whether the shock produces a path of debt that is stable or tends to
become explosive.6
When debt is introduced into the VAR this variable needs to be made endogenous,
otherwise impulse response functions would be computed assuming a constant debt
ratio, thus ruling out the very reason why debt is included in the ﬁrst place–namely
to allow macro variables to respond to the eﬀect of the tax shock on the level of the
debt. The way to make the debt ratio endogenous is to add to the model the equation
that describes how it evolves over time as a function of the path of all other variables,
5The small remaining diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nt h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s e sc a nb er a t i o n a l i z e do nt h eg r o u n d
that, following Blanchard-Perotti (2002), we specify our ﬁscal VAR in the (log) levels of the macroe-
conimic variables.
6Ar e s p o n s eo fm a c r o e c o n o m i cv a r i a b l e si so fc o u rse necessary for stability of the debt ratio–
except in the special case in which the rate of growth of the economy is exactly equal to the average
cost of debt ﬁnancing.
8i.e. the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 7 This is why, as mentioned
in the previous Section, we included these ﬁve particular variables (output growth,
government revenues, government spending, inﬂation and nominal interest rates) in
our VAR: because they appear in the government intertemporal budget constraint.
Doing this, however, makes the model non-linear because the government in-









xt ≡ πt + ∆yt + πt∆yt
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h i sn o n - l i n e a r i t yi sc o m p a t ible with a range of alternative theoretical
models, since it simply arises from the possibility that the macroeconomic variables
included in the VAR respond to the level of the debt ratio.
In this Section we study whether the multiplier associated with the R&R tax
shocks changes when one keeps track of the eﬀect that such shocks have on the path
of the debt ratio through a non-linear budget constraint and allows for a response of
macroeconomic variables to the level of the debt.
Before doing this, however, it is worth asking why debt has been systematically
excluded from empirical investigations of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy–not only from
the estimates by R&R, but essentially from the entire empirical literature (Edelberg
et al, 1999, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Mountford Uhlig, 2002, Fat` as and Mihov,
2001 among other). The omission of a debt feedback from estimated ﬁscal VARs is
surprising also because the equilibrium structural models used to analyse the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy are typically solved by imposing the government intertemporal budget
constraint and are simulated under the assumption that the real value of the debt in
the hands of the public must equal the expected present value of government surpluses.
It is thus natural to ask why debt has been systematically excluded. One justiﬁcation
is that the eﬀects of this variable are captured by all other variables included in a
ﬁscal VAR. For instance Z, in (2), contains all the variables that enter the government
intertemporal budget constraint and thus determine the dynamics of the debt ratio.
The diﬀerence is that the debt dynamics equation is non-linear, while the VAR is
linear
Whether or not including the debt ratio directly in the VAR makes a diﬀerence
thus depends on how good an approximation the linear version of (8) is. This requires
7Note that the budget constraint is an identity: it does not add new parameters to be estimated,
nor new shocks to be identiﬁed.
9that the debt-to-GDP ratio is stationary and that all other conditions for the validity
of the linearization are met: in this case impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks are to be
interpreted as the response of the economy computed at the mean of the stationary
government debt-to-GDP ratio.
3.1 Estimating the eﬀects of tax changes keeping track of debt dy-
namics
To check the empirical importance of taking non-linearity seriously–thus including in
the VAR both the debt level and the budget constraint–we have computed impulse






t + γi (dt−1 − d∗)+et (9)
with dt deﬁned as (8). In (9) macroeconomic variables are assumed to respond not to
the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, but to its distance from a target level d∗. Although
this assumption is irrelevant for the results, we make it to estimate an equation that
mirrors that estimated in Bohn (1998). As in Bohn we take 0.35, as the target value
for d∗–a value which, as shown in Figure A1, is also the average debt level in our
sample.
Note that because (9) is non linear, constructing an MA representation of Zt is
no longer possible. This might induce an additional source of mis-speciﬁcation of the
single equation estimated by R&R.8
8Also notice that the estimation of (9) diﬀers from the procedure followed by Chung and Leeper
(2007). These authors recognize the importance of including the government budget constraint
because the present value condition implied by the linearized budget constraint–that the real value
o ft h ed e b tm u s te q u a lt h ee x p e c t e dp r e s e n t - v a l u eof surpluses–generates a set of cross-equation
restrictions on traditional ﬁscal VARs. Their results show that imposing such restrictions makes some
diﬀerence for impulse response analysis. Our procedure doesn’t need to assume that the conditions
for linearization are satisﬁed: by augmenting the traditional ﬁscal VAR with the equation describing
the debt-deﬁcit dynamics, our impulse responses satisfy by construction (period-by-period) the debt-
deﬁcit stock-ﬂow relationship. We can therefore directly evaluate the validity of the tranversality
condition by considering the long-run response of dt to ﬁscal shocks and by checking if it converges
to zero.
103.2 Computing impulse responses with stocks and ﬂows
After all the parameters in (9) have been estimated, we are left with the problem of
constructing impulse responses. Given the special nature of (9), the computation of
impulse responses requires going through the following steps:
• generate a baseline simulation for all variables by solving (9) dynamically for-
ward (this requires setting to zero all shocks for a number of periods equal to
the horizon up to which impulse responses are needed),
• generate an alternative simulation for all variables by setting to one—just for the
ﬁrst period of the simulation—the structural shock of interest, and then solve
dynamically forward the model up to the same horizon used in the baseline
simulation,
• compute impulse responses to the structural shocks as the diﬀerence between
the simulated values in the two steps above. (Note that these steps, if applied
to a standard VAR, would produce standard impulse responses. In our case
they produce impulse responses that allow for both the feedback from dt−i to
Zt and for the endogeneity of dt modelled via (8)),
• compute conﬁdence intervals by bootstrap methods.9
3.3 Is non-linearity empirically important?
We illustrate the empirical relevance of estimating tax multpliers by including debt
and the government intertemporal budget constraint comparing the impulse responses
obtained using (9) with those shown in Section 2. The results are in Figure 4, both
for the entire sample and for the two sub-samples considered separately.
The two sets of impulse responses illustrate that the model augmented with debt
and the non-linear debt dynamics equation produces results which are very similar
to those obtained by including the R&R shocks in a traditional ﬁscal VAR .Figure 4
conﬁrms that when the R&R measure of tax shocks is considered within a multiple
equation model, rather than in a single equation framework, the estimated multpliers
9Bootstrapping requires saving the residuals from the estimated VAR and then iterating the
following steps: a) re-sample from the saved residuals and generate a set of observation for Zt and
dt, b) estimate the VAR, c) compute impulse responses going thorough the steps described in the
text, d) go back to step a). By going thorugh 1,000 iterations we produce bootstrapped distributions
for impulse responses and compute conﬁdence intervals.
11are much smaller. However, while simultaneity is important, we ﬁnd no major empir-
ical diﬀerence between a non-linear model with an explicit debt dynamics equation
and a linearized model where the eﬀect of debt is captured by its components.
Interestingly, the impulse responses based on the linearized model and on the
non-linear model with debt diﬀer in the second subsample where the eﬀect of an
exogenous increase in taxes aﬀects negatively and signiﬁcantly output growth (with a
peak eﬀect of about 0.5 per cent), while the same eﬀect is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in the model without debt. This is because the feedback from the debt
ratio to government revenues and spending is stronger in the second sub-sample 10–
but the linearized model computes impulse responses at the mean of the stationary
government debt ratio and thus fails to capture this feedback..
4 Conclusions
We have estimated the multiplier associated with the narrative shifts in taxes con-
structed by R&R (forthcoming) without imposing that tax shocks are orthogonal to
any information dated (t − 11), i.e. that they are uncorrelated with past macroeco-
nomic outcomes. We ﬁnd a much smaller multiplier: 1, rather than 3 at a three-year
horizon. We also ﬁnd that the multplier changes signiﬁcantly before and after 1980,
when the impact of tax shocks becomes not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
We have also estimated the multiplier keeping track of the eﬀect of tax shocks
on the level of the debt-GDP ratio. We have done this allowing for the non-linearity
which arises from the government budget constraint. We ﬁnd that, while in general
not very important, this non-linearity makes a diﬀerence after 1980, when the response
of ﬁscal variables to the level of the debt becomes stronger.
The methodology we have developed to analyze the impact of tax shocks by keep-
ing track of the non-linear budget constraint, could be used in other settings. For
instance, the discussions on the importance of including capital as a slow-moving vari-
able to capture the relation between productivity shocks and hours worked (see e.g.
Christiano et al, 2005 and Chari et al. 2005) could beneﬁtf r o ma ne s t i m a t i o nt e c h -
nique that tracks the dynamics of the capital stock generated by the relevant shocks.
The same applies to open economy models that study, for instance, the eﬀects of a
productivity shock on the current account and that typically omit a feedback from
the stock of external debt to macroeconomic variables.
10I nF a v e r oa n dG i a v a z z i( 2 0 0 7 )w ed o c u m e n th o wt h er e s p o n s eo fU . S .ﬁscal variables to the level
of the debt ratio changes around 1980.
12This approach could also be used in the analysis of the eﬀects of tax shocks on
debt sustainability, an issue which cannot be addressed in the context of a VAR that
fails to keep track of debt dynamics.
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146D a t a A p p e n d i x
yt is (the log of) real GDP per capita, πt is the log diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂa-
tor. Data for the stock of U.S. public debt and for population are from the FRED
database (available on the Federal Reserve of St.Louis website,also downloaded on
December 7th 2006). Our measure for gt is (the log of) real per capita primary gov-
ernment expenditure: nominal expenditure is obtained subtracting from total Federal
Government Current Expenditure (line 39, NIPA Table 3.2 ) net interest payments
at annual rates (obtained as the diﬀerence between line 28 and line 13 on the same
table). Real per capita expenditure is then obtained by dividing the nominal variable
by population times the GDP chain deﬂator. Our measure for τt is (the log of) real
per capita government receipts at annual rates (the nominal variable is reported on
line 36 of the same NIPA Table).
The R&R tax shocks start in 1947, while our data only start in 1950:1 because
data for total governemnt spending are available on a consistent basis only from
1950:1. We thus exclude the exogenous shocks that occurred between January 1947
and December 1949.
Our approach requires that the debt-dynamics equation (8) tracks the path of dt
accurately: we thus need to deﬁne the variables in this equation with some care. The
source for the diﬀerent components of the budget deﬁcit and for all macroeconomic
variables are the NIPA accounts (available on the Bureau of Economic Analysis web-
site, downloaded on December 7th 2006). The average cost servicing the debt, it,i s
obtained by dividing net interest payments by the federal government debt held by
the public (FYGFDPUN in the Fred database) at time t−1. The federal government
debt held by the public is smaller than the gross federal debt, which is the broadest
deﬁnition of the U.S. public debt. However, not all gross debt represents past bor-
rowing in the credit markets since a portion of the gross federal debt is held by trust
funds—primarily the Social Security Trust Fund, but also other funds: the Trust Fund
for Unemployment Insurance, the Highway Trust Fund, the pension fund of federal
employees, etc.. The assets held by these funds consist of non-marketable debt.11 We
thus exclude it from our deﬁnition of federal public debt. We are unable to build the
debt series back to 1947:1, the start of the Romer and Romer sample, because, as
mentioned above, data for total governemnt spending, needed to buld the debt series,
are available on a consistent basis only from 1950:1
11Cashell (2006) notes that ”this debt exists only as a book-keeping entry, and does not reﬂect
past borrowing in credit markets.”
15Figure A-1 reports, starting in 1970:1 (the ﬁrst quarter for which the debt data
are available in FRED), this measure of the debt held by the public as a fraction of
GDP (this is the dotted line). We have checked the accuracy of the debt dynamics
equation in (8) simulating it forward from 1970:1 (this is the continuous line in Figure
A-1). The simulated series is virtually super-imposed to the actual one: the small
diﬀerences are due to approximation errors in computing inﬂation and growth rates as
logarithmic diﬀerences, and to the fact that the simulated series are obtained by using
seasonally adjusted measures of expenditures and revenues. Based on this evidence
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Figure A1: Actual (DY) and simulated (DY I) (dynamically backward and forward
starting in 1970:1) debt-GDP ratio. Actual data are observed at quarterly frequency
from 1970 onwards and at annual frequency from 1970 backward. The simulated
data are constructed using the government intertemporal budget constraint (8) with
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Figure 1: Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP:
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Figure 2: Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP:
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Figure 3: Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP,
single equation approach. R&R speciﬁcation (dots) and speciﬁcation augmented
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Figure 4: Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP:
R&R single equation approach (dots), Fiscal VAR with (interrupted lines) and
without (continuous line) the government intertemporal budget constraint
20